Hai Yang，Hai-Jun Huang的新书《MATHEMATICAL AND ECONOMIC THEO&#

shoregh

[这个贴子最后由shoregh在 2007/06/14 02:57pm 第 1 次编辑]


Published by Elsevier,  Date: 26 September, 2005
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookdescription.cws_home/705555/description#description

Description
Road pricing as an effective instrument to manage travel demand and raise additional revenue for transport improvement has been studied extensively by both transportation researchers and economists. An increasing number of congestion pricing schemes have been proposed, tested or implemented worldwide. This book provides the most recent methodological advances in applying advanced modeling techniques to road pricing. Most studies presented in the book are carried out within the general network equilibrium context with rigorous optimization and economic theories. The book is thus distinguished from other monographs that have focused on the empirical aspects, policy experiences, and environmental issues of road congestion and road pricing.

Contents
Introduction. Fundamentals of User-Equilibrium Problems. The First-Best Road Pricing Problems. The Second-Best Road Pricing Problems: A Sensitivity Analysis Based Approach.The Second-Best Road Pricing Problems: A Gap Function Based Approach. Discriminatory and Anonymous Road Pricing. Social and Spatial Equities and Revenue Redistribution. Pricing, Capacity Choice and Financing. Simultaneous Determination of Optimal Toll Levels and Locations. Sequential Pricing Experiments with Limited Information. Bounding the Efficiency Gain or Loss of Road Pricing. Dynamic Road Pricing: Single and Parallel Bottleneck Models. Dynamic Road Pricing: General Network Models.
ISBN: 0-08-044487-3, Hardbound, 466 pages
没有发现价格，肯定不会便宜

shoregh

Price：
GBP 85
USD 135
EUR 120

afei2002

终于看到黄老师出新书了，而且一出就是English的，厉害……
前段时间好像黄老师也和人合作了一本书（中文的），不知道出来没有……
庆祝一下了！！！

shoregh

清华大学出版社还将出版集交通规划领域最新研究成果为一体的研究导向型教材《交通规划理论研究前沿》，该书作为重量级的高等交通规划理论教材，目前由包括黄海军、杨海、冉斌、林兴强教授等 10位国内外交通领域的著名中青年华裔学者共同执笔，该书出版后将会成为从事交通规划理论研究的硕士、博士以及博士后的必读书目，计划在今年12月底之前完稿，并交由清华大学出版社出版发行。

qinjin

看到楼主的消息,心中一喜
看到书籍的价格,心中一凉

transport

这是一本很有价值的必读教科书！

wxiong

下面引用由shoregh在 2005/08/16 12:13pm 发表的内容：
清华大学出版社还将出版集交通规划领域最新研究成果为一体的研究导向型教材《交通规划理论研究前沿》，该书作为重量级的高等交通规划理论教材，目前由包括黄海军、杨海、冉斌、林兴强教授等 10位国内外交通领域　...

黄老师的这本书什么时候能够出版啊，有没有相关章节的内容先睹为快。

andsimple

这里好东东真多啊，差不多每天都有新收获，总感觉时间不够用啊，好多东东弄到了又没时间看，唉

du1wen

东西很定不错了，可惜没有money享受啊，有没有让我们先睹为快的东东啊？

andsimple

主要讲收费方面的，有静态也有动态哦

andsimple

什么时候能拜读啊

huanghaijun

很抱歉! 受出版社版权制约, 我们目前还不能在网上挂出全书来.
这里将书的目录给出, 大家可以到学校图书馆借阅此书 (相信图书馆订购的书差不多快到了).
CONTENT
Acronymsxv
Glossary of Notationxvii
Prefacexxi
1Introduction1
1.1Background1
1.2Theoretical Developments1
1.2.1The first-best pricing problem2
1.2.2The second-best pricing problems3
1.2.3Value of time and road pricing4
1.2.4Equity issues and revenue redistribution in road pricing5
1.2.5The road pricing and capacity choice problem6
1.2.6Mathematical programming approach to road pricing8
1.2.7Dynamic road pricing problem9
1.3Outline of the Book10
2Fundamentals of User-Equilibrium Problems13
2.1Introduction13
2.2Formulations of the Standard User-Equilibrium (UE) Problems15
2.2.1The UE model with fixed demand15
2.2.2Solution method for the fixed demand UE problem17
2.2.3The UE model with elastic demand19
2.2.4Solution method for the elastic demand UE problem20
2.3Traffic Assignment with Link Capacity Constraints22
2.3.1Model formulation22
2.3.2Solution algorithm24
2.4Traffic Assignment with Non-Separable Link Travel Time Functions27
2.4.1Asymmetric link flow interactions27
2.4.2Symmetric link flow interactions30
2.4.3Flow interactions between multiple types of vehicles31
2.4.4Positive definiteness of link cost functions with flow interactions31
2.4.5Practical asymmetric link cost functions32
2.4.6Diagonalization solution algorithm34
2.5Traffic Assignment of Multi-Class Users with Different Values of Time34
2.5.1Model formulation35
2.5.2Equivalence of the time-based and cost-based multi-class traffic
equilibrium36
2.6Traffic Assignment with Non-Additive Path Costs38
2.6.1Model formulation38
2.6.2Solution algorithm39
2.6.3An analytical example40
2.7Traffic Assignment with Stochastic Route Choice41
2.7.1Utility function and discrete route choice model41
2.7.2Model formulation with fixed demand42
2.7.3Model formulation with elastic demand43
2.8System Optimum Traffic Assignment43
2.9Sources and Notes45
3The First-Best Road Pricing Problems47
3.1Introduction47
3.2Marginal-Cost Pricing under Standard User-Equilibrium48
3.2.1Graphical interpretation48
3.2.2Fixed demand case50
3.2.3Elastic demand case52
3.3Marginal-Cost Pricing with Link Capacity Constraints54
3.3.1Pricing model with capacity constraints54
3.3.2Speed-flow relationship for congestion pricing56
3.4Marginal-Cost Pricing with a Total Environmental Quality Constraint60
3.5Marginal-Cost Pricing with Link Flow Interactions and Multiple Vehicle Types62
3.5.1The case with link flow interactions62
3.5.2The case with multiple vehicle types63
3.6Marginal-Cost Pricing and Uniqueness of Social Optimum64
3.6.1Uniqueness of OD demands64
3.6.2Uniqueness of link flows with separable link cost functions65
3.6.3Uniqueness of link flows with non-separable link cost functions66
3.6.4Analytical examples71
3.7Marginal-Cost Pricing under Stochastic User Equilibrium74
3.7.1Economic benefit measure and maximization74
3.7.2Equivalence to the minimization of expected perceived travel cost76
3.7.3An analytical example77
3.8Summary79
3.9Sources and Notes79
4The Second-Best Road Pricing Problems: A Sensitivity Analysis Based Approach81
4.1Introduction81
4.2Formulation as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints82
4.3Sensitivity Analysis of Traffic Equilibria with Pricing84
4.3.1Sensitivity analysis of the restricted network equilibrium problem84
4.3.2Relations to other gradient-based sensitivity analysis methods91
4.3.3Dissection of sensitivity analysis with analytical examples93
4.3.4A sensitivity analysis based algorithm108
4.4Applications of the Sensitivity Analysis Method109
4.5Traffic Restraint and Road Pricing Problem113
4.5.1A conceptual framework113
4.5.2Direct solution with the queuing network equilibrium model114
4.5.3Non-uniqueness of link tolls for environmental capacity constraint116
4.5.4Selection of optimal tolls by bi-level programming117
4.6Summary120
4.7Sources and Notes121
5The Second-Best Road Pricing Problems: A Gap Function Based Approach123
5.1Introduction123
5.2Marginal Function Based Approach124
5.2.1Gap function for the VI based traffic equilibrium models124
5.2.2Gap function for the optimization based traffic equilibrium models127
5.2.3Reformulation as continuously differentiable optimization problems129
5.2.4A scheme of the augmented Lagrangian algorithm130
5.3Applications of the Gap Function Approach131
5.4Entry-Exit Based Toll Design Problems139
5.4.1A UE model with entry-exit specific tolls140
5.4.2Solving the UE model with entry-exit specific tolls by network
decomposition144
5.4.3Alternative tolling schemes146
5.4.4BLPP formulation and gap function approach148
5.4.5Solution by the augmented Lagrangian algorithm150
5.4.6Numerical example and discussion of results153
5.5Summary159
5.6Sources and Notes160
6Discriminatory and Anonymous Road Pricing161
6.1Introduction161
6.2Toll Properties for the Single Class UE and SO Problems163
6.2.1Characterization of link tolls for SO163
6.2.2A simple example for the valid link toll set to decentralize SO166
6.3Time-Based and Cost-Based Multi-Class UE and SO Problems168
6.3.1System optimum in time units and pricing for equilibrium169
6.3.2System optimum in cost units and pricing for equilibrium174
6.3.3Analytical examples176
6.4Multiple Equilibrium Behaviors and SO Problems181
6.4.1UE-CN multiple behavior equilibrium and system optimum182
6.4.2Anonymous link tolls to decentralize a system optimum186
6.4.3An analytical example189
6.5Multi-UE-Class and Multi-CN-Class Behavior Equilibrium and SO Problem192
6.5.1Multi-criteria and multiple behavior equilibrium and system optimum193
6.5.2Anonymous link tolls to decentralize a system optimum195
6.5.3An analytical example197
6.7Summary200
6.8Sources and Notes201
7Social and Spatial Equities and Revenue Redistribution203
7.1Introduction203
7.2The Social and Spatial Inequity: An Example204
7.3Redistribution of Congestion Pricing Revenue210
7.3.1Existence of a Pareto refunding scheme210
7.3.2Design of Pareto refunding schemes218
7.3.3Remarks on the Pareto refunding schemes224
7.4Network Toll Design Models with Equity Constraints225
7.4.1Traffic equilibrium and social welfare with pricing225
7.4.2Specification of equity constraints226
7.4.3Network toll design with equity constraints228
7.5Alternative Solution Approaches230
7.5.1Solution for bi-level model230
7.5.2Solution for tri-level model232
7.6A Numerical Example232
7.7Summary237
7.8Sources and Notes238
8Pricing, Capacity Choice and Financing239
8.1Introduction239
8.2User Equilibrium and Performance Evaluation for Private Toll Roads240
8.2.1Multi-class UE model with elastic demand240
8.2.2Alternative performance measures241
8.3Profitability, Social Welfare Gain and Optimal Price-Capacity Adjustments243
8.3.1Experiment setting243
8.3.2Characterization and analysis of numerical results245
8.4Profitability and Welfare Gain of Private Toll Roads with Heterogeneous Users247
8.4.1Experiment setting248
8.4.2Characterization and analysis of numerical results251
8.5Self-Financial in General Networks255
8.5.1Self-financing rules with a single type of vehicles255
8.5.2Self-financing rules with multiple types of vehicles263
8.6Competition and Equilibria of Private Toll Roads267
8.6.1Monopolistic competition267
8.6.2Alternative formulation268
8.6.3Solution methods270
8.6.4Two analytical examples272
8.6.5Graphical characterization of toll competition274
8.7Summary281
8.8Sources and Notes282
9Simultaneous Determination of Optimal Toll Levels and Locations283
9.1Introduction283
9.2The Link-Based Pricing: Methodology284
9.2.1Genetic algorithm for determination of optimal tolling links284
9.2.2Selection of minimal number and locations of tolling links287
9.3The Link-Based Pricing: Example287
9.4The Cordon-Based Pricing: Methodology290
9.4.1Mathematical properties of toll cordons291
9.4.2Types of cordon294
9.4.3Determination of tolling cordons296
9.5The Cordon-Based Pricing: Example301
9.5.1Determination of location of a single-layered tolling cordon303
9.5.2Determination of location of double-layered tolling cordons303
9.5.3Impact of the cordon-based pricing on trip length distribution304
9.5.4Sensitivity analysis of demand elasticity306
9.6Summary306
9.7Sources and Notes307
10Sequential Pricing Experiments with Limited Information309
10.1Introduction309
10.2Implementation of the First-Best Pricing Scheme310
10.2.1An iterative toll adjustment procedure for a single road311
10.2.2An iterative toll adjustment procedure for a general network313
10.2.3Proof of convergence316
10.2.4A numerical example320
10.3Implementation of the Second-Best Pricing Scheme325
10.3.1A sequential implementation procedure325
10.3.2Sequential linear approximation328
10.3.3Two numerical examples329
10.4Implementation of the Traffic Restraint and Road Pricing Scheme335
10.4.1The primal and dual formulation335
10.4.2Trial-and-error implementation procedure337
10.4.3A numerical example339
10.5Summary341
10.6Sources and Notes343
11Bounding the Efficiency Gain or Loss of Road Pricing345
11.1Introduction345
11.2Maximum Efficiency Gain of First-Best Pricing Schemes346
11.2.1Efficiency gain with fixed demand346
11.2.2Efficiency gain for cost functions with limited congestion effects352
11.2.3Efficiency gain with elastic demand354
11.3Inefficiency of Stochastic User Equilibria358
11.3.1Determination of the cost inefficiency bound359
11.3.2Interpretation of the cost inefficiency bound362
11.4Inefficiency of Cournot-Nash Equilibria363
11.4.1CN equilibrium with a finite number of players363
11.4.2Upper-bound of the inefficiency of CN equilibria365
11.4.3Upper-bound of special cases and a numerical example367
11.5Maximum Efficiency Loss of Second-Best Pricing Schemes369
11.5.1Measure of efficiency loss369
11.5.2Bound for traffic equilibria with fixed demands370
11.5.3Bound with polynomial cost functions375
11.5.4Bound for traffic equilibria with elastic demands378
11.5.5Alternative approach for bounding efficiency loss383
11.5.6Determination of the inefficiency bound for actual pricing schemes384
11.6Summary387
11.7Sources and Notes387
12Dynamic Road Pricing: Single and Parallel Bottleneck Models389
12.1Introduction389
12.2Single Bottleneck Models389
12.2.1The case with homogeneous commuters390
12.2.2The case with heterogeneous commuters395
12.3Parallel Bottleneck Models400
12.3.1Dynamic tolls on all routes400
12.3.2Dynamic tolls on partial routes402
12.4Bottleneck Pricing and Modal Split403
12.4.1Competition between mass transit and highway404
12.4.2Pricing and logit-based mode choice with elastic demand414
12.5Summary420
12.6Sources and Notes421
13Dynamic Road Pricing: General Network Models423
13.1Introduction423
13.2Problem Description424
13.3Space-Time Expanded Network426
13.3.1Basic assumptions426
13.3.2Static temporal expanded network427
13.3.3Traffic on the STEN429
13.3.4Link exit capacity and travel cost on the STEN430
13.4System Optimum, Externality and Congestion Toll431
13.4.1Model formulation431
13.4.2Optimality conditions432
13.4.3Externality and congestion toll434
13.5Numerical Examples435
13.5.1A single bottleneck network435
13.5.2A general bottleneck network438
13.6Summary441
13.7Sources and Notes441
References443
Subject Index461

shoregh

本来想上传这本书的，想想黄老师这样说，还是不要放到网上了
我当时也是找北航的朋友复印的
贴上封面前言目录和参考文献部分吧
希望大家不要一味追求文献，遇到问题大家可以探讨

huanghaijun

天快亮了,匆匆留言:
如果有读者急需此书, 可以与我的学生联系, 直接要求他们帮您复印,我已经与他们打过招呼了.
注意书中有点排版错误, 几个公式中的"?", 其实是"lamda", 估计大家看了上下文可以判断出.
昨天Hai Yang刚从北京回香港, 交流了情况. 出版社告知目前此书总共销售了800多本,都是图书馆购买. 鉴于价格因素, 我们对复印后个人的私人使用, 没有意见.

huanghaijun

关于清华大学出版社出版的书, 由于出版社要求十分严格, 陆化普教授和我校了好几次, 时间长了点,很抱歉! 5月1日,此书已经正式上市, 48元/本, 在出版社和中关村的图书大厦有售, 是否已经发到了新华书店, 还不知道. 对于这种读者群小的专业书籍, 新华书店总是不太愿意进的.